Operationalizing the Central Government Transfer Intercept Mechanism
Final Report (Draft)
Introduction
The first offence requires application of the permanent intercept (pemotongan), whereby arrears on loans from the Government are intercepted from periodic revenue transfers to defaulting regional governments and restored to MoF Treasury, whereas the other three provoke a temporary intercept or deferment (penundaan) of such transfers until such time as the offenses have been Introduction corrected and the causes for deferment have been removed.
The potential impacts of the (both permanent and temporary) intercept mechanism on the ability of regional governments to meet their basic needs expenditure, by simulating and analyzing a series of scenarios for a sample of 27 provinces and 220 kota and kabupaten (covering 89% and 63% of the nation's population, respectively). The simulation used data taken from audited financial reports for 2005 and 2006 .
Outcomes of Phase I.
Following a review and discussion of the Interim Report, DJPK decided to limit the scope of the draft decree to the permanent intercept of arrears of loans from Government to regional governments (i.e. excluding the tempo rary intercept), with the size of the intercept stipulated in accordance with the Consultant's recommendation and based on the capacity of each defaulting regional government to meet its basic needs expenditure.
The draft decree concerning 'Implementation Arrangements for Intercepting the DAU and/or DBH Relating to Loans by Government to Regional Governments' 2 was awaiting the Minister's signature at the time of writing.
Scope of Phase II.
The scope of this phase is to analyze the administrative and accounting mechanisms required to put the permanent intercept into effect.
The administrative requirements refer to the annual regulations and decrees that allocate DAU and DBH to regional governments, and the need to examine their appropriateness with respect to the draft decree.
The accounting mechanisms for effecting the intercept and transferring the intercepted funds to the Treasury have been analyzed and discussed since the submission of the Interim Report. These procedures have been agreed upon and are contained in Sections 10-12 of the draft decree. The relevant paragraphs of this report summarize the steps required to initiate and complete the mechanism.
Status and Contents of this Report
Status. This report is a draft, which covers 'Detailed Concept Design. A final version will be submitted in the second half of September 2008 for review by the Ministry of Finance and DSF.
Summary of contents.
Chapter 2 discusses administrative requirements to decrees and regulations that govern the allocation of DAU and DBH to regional governments, to ensure that the intercept mechanism remains effective. Chapter 3 describes the key features of an accounting mechanism that directs intercepted funds to the Treasury, and remits the balance of the transfer to the defaulting regional government. The Annex to this report contains the results of simulations the Consultant has performed at the request of DJPK since the publication of the Interim Report. (This Interim Report also contains a detailed overview of the intercept mechanism itself.) Gas*** 70% 6% 12% 12%
Source: PP104/2000 * To be allocated for administration costs (9%) and districts (6.5% as equal lump sum per district and 3.5% based on collection performance) ** To be allocated to districts (equal lump sum per district) ***Allocation after taxes and duties 3 In this report, the term 'district government' refers to a municipality (kota) or regency (kabupaten), whereas the term 'regional government' refers to a district or province.
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Composition of DBH. The DBH consists of a series of transfers financed from: (i) shared tax revenues, and (ii) shared revenues from natural resources exploitation (Table 2 .1). The DBH taxes are: the lands and buildings tax (PBB), the land and buildings management tax (BPHTB), and the income tax (PPh). The DBH natural resource (sumber daya alam) revenues are derived from:
General mining (pertambangan umum)
Oil (pertambangan minyak bumi)
Natural gas (pertambangan gas bumi)
Geothermal energy (pertambangan panas bumi)
Legal basis for distribution of DAU and DBH. The estimated revenue collections by the Government in respect of the above are stipulated in the annual national budget (APBN). The total amounts of DAU and DBH to be disaggregated and subsequently distributed to the regional governments, also stipulated in the annual budget, are based on formulae provided in Law 33/2004 and PP 55/2005 . The disaggregation is determined by a series of annual regulations and decrees. DAU allocations are based on the fiscal capacity of a regional govern ment. The allocation of DBH to provinces and districts depends, to some extent, on the amounts of taxes and natural resource revenue collected by 'producing districts'. The amounts of DAU payable to each regional government during the following fiscal year are then published in a presidential decree (Peraturan Presiden or PerPres), and those for the DBH in a series of tax and royalty-specific decrees issued by the Minister of Finance (Peraturan Menteri Keuangan or PMK).
Recommended Adjustments to PP and PMKs
Scope of the analysis. The following documents relating to DAU and DBH allocations in FY 2008 were examined to assess what adjustments (if any) would need to be made to permit the use of the permanent intercept against these allocations:
PP ( Rights to adjust DAU and DBH allocations for the permanent intercept. The Consultant considers that additional language is advisable in all these documents to ensure that the Government is equipped with the appropriate regulatory sanction to make direct intercepts against allocations of DAU and DBH before their transfer to the regional governments. It is suggested that this could be achieved, by way of example, by inserting an additional sub-section to Section 6 of PP 110/2007, so that the adjusted section would read in its entirety as follows:
Pasal 6
(
1) Rincian besarnya alokasi Dana Alokasi Umum Tahun 200_ sebagaimana dimaksud dalam Pasal 4 ayat i untuk Daerah Provinsi dan Kabupaten/ Kota sebagaimana tercantum dalam lampiran Peraturan Presiden ini.
(1) The detailed allocations of the aggregate amount of DAU to be transferred to provincial and district regional governments, as specified in Section 4 Sub-Section 1 above, is provided in the attachment to this Presidential Decree [i.e. unchanged from the existing Section 6 of PP 110/2007].
(2) Rincian besarnya Dana Alokasi Umum sebagaimana dimaksud pada ayat (1) dapat diubah sewaktu-waktu yang dilakukan dengan berdasarkan pada peraturan perundang-undangan yang berlaku.
(2) The detailed allocations of the DAU referred to in Sub-Section 1 above may, from time to time, be adjusted in accordance with the requirements of existing laws, regulations and decrees.
Suitable provisions in line with the above should also be inserted in the individual PMK for the DBH allocations.
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Application to other intercepts. It should be noted that these recommended adjustments would also be applicable for facilitating intercepts of transfers to regional governments for reasons other than those in the draft decree to recover arrears on non-performing loans. For example, Section 6, Sub-Section 2 of PP 39/2007 concerning Management of Central/Regional Government Cash (Pengelolaan Uang Negara/Daerah) states that:
"The State Treasury has the authority to assess, collect and intercept shared fiscal balance transfers or other regional government assets arising from liabilities to Government not yet discharged by regional governments"
The elucidations to this sub-section include non-payment of income tax, sales tax and pension contributions due as examples of such undischarged liabilities, which could be collected via the intercept using the additional language recommended above in the allocation instruments.
Introduction. An accounting mechanism needs to be established that will, in the case of the draft decree on the permanent intercept, direct the intercepted funds, representing the amount of the loan arrears, to the Treasury and remit the balance of the transfer to the defaulting regional government. The Consultant has discussed this matter with the Directorate of Accounting and Financial Reporting (Direktorat Akuntansi dan Pelaporan Keuangan or DAPK) in the Treasury. The procedures to be observed are as follows:
Request for account number. The budget user (Kuasa Pengguna Anggaran or KPA) within MoF for all Government transfers to regional governments is DJPK.
There is at present no account number (Mata Anggaran Keuangan or MAK) to implement the accounting transfer resulting from the intercept. As the budget user, DJPK should make a formal request to DG Treasury for an MAK to be issued by DAPL.
Report on loan defaults. The Directorate of On-Lending Management (DPPP) will periodically send lists of defaulting regional governments to DJPK. These lists will contain loan details and amounts of arrears to be intercepted.
Determine interceptable fund.
As the budget user, DJPK will determine which source of funds transfer to regional governments will be intercepted. Within DJPK, there are a number of administrative units (Satuan Kerja or Satker) supervising intergovernmental transfers. The Satker for the fund selected to be intercepted will prepare a request for payment (Surat Permintaan Membayar or SPM), which will specify the amount to be intercepted, the MAK and the KPA to whom the intercepted funds will be credited, plus the balance to be transferred to the defaulting regional government.
Report to DPPP. The Satker in DJPK will send the original SPM to the Directorate of Cash Management (DPKN), with a copy to DPPP.
Issue SP2D. Upon receipt of the SPM, DPKN will issue a payment authorization (Surat Perintah Pencairan Dana or SP2D), which authorizes payment of the intercepted amount to the Treasury and the balance to the defaulting regional government.
Ensure consistency with DIPA. All Government transfers to regional governments stipulated in the APBN are allocated by the Treasury through a budget implementing mechanism (Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran or DIPA). The operationalizing mechanism is described in PMK 04/2008 concerning the implementation of budget transfers to regional governments (pelaksanaan dan pertanggungjawaban anggaran transfer ke daerah). This PMK specifies the periodicity of annual transfers and the percentages of annual transfers for each transfer for each fund. These provisions must be taken into account at the time each SPM is prepared and the amount of the intercept calculated. For example, the DAU is paid monthly in equal amounts and therefore the total amount to be intercepted must be divided by 12 for each single intercept made against the DAU. In the case of the DBH, transfers are made quarterly but in varying 
A1
Introduction. Chapter 3 of the Interim Report contained a scenario analysis for basic needs expenditure. The analysis concluded that the 75% best-performing regional governments allocated about 80% of total revenue on operational expenditure, and 12% on investment expenditure. DJPK requested the Consultant to perform the same analysis for the 'top 65%' and 'top 85%' of regional governments, and to assess the impact of a permanent intercept on the finances of the three groups (top 65%, top 75%, and top 85%). The results of these analyses are presented here.
Definition of Base Case, Small Majority and Large Majority
Scenario analysis for basic needs expenditure. Basic needs expenditure consists of wages and salaries, goods and services, duty travel and maintenance, and financial support salaries plus a percentage -ranging from 0% to 100% -of investment expenditure. In formula:
BNERG,t = OERG,t + IERG,t [3-2]
where BNERG, t the basic needs expenditure of regional government RG in year t OERG, t actual expenditure of regional government RG in financial year t on salaries, goods and services, maintenance and travel IERG, t actual investment expenditure of regional government RG in year t a coefficient with a value ranging from 0% to 100%
Standard budget for basic needs expenditure. As mentioned before, the Government would wish to have a transparent and equitable formula for calculating intercept space. This objective would be achieved by estimating basic needs expenditure as a fixed portion of regional government revenue. Thus: BNE*RG,t = ( + ) REVRG, where BNE*RG, t standard basic needs expenditure of regional government RG in year t REVRG, t actual revenue of regional government RG in year t standard portion of revenue available for spending on salaries, goods and services, maintenance and travel (OERG, t) standard portion of revenue available for spending on investment (IERG, total revenue a regional government would be expected to spend on salaries, goods and services, maintenance and travel. Because the Government expects regional governments to lower this percentage in the long run (thereby freeing up funds for increased investment in public services), the coefficient was initially estimated by the maximum percentage spent by 75% of the best-performing regional governments (i.e. regions that spent the lowest portion of their revenue on 'OERG, t'). In 2005 and 2006, this percentage varied from 76% to 89% (Table  A1 .1). The proposed value for use in Equation is 80% in the 'base case majority' scenario.
Investment expenditure as a percentage of total revenue ( ): the base case scenario. This coefficient would indicate the minimum portion of total revenue a regional government would be expected to spend on investment in physical assets. Because the Government expects regional governments to increase this percentage in the long run (thereby increasing the quality of public services), the coefficient was initially estimated by the minimum percentage spent by 75% of the best-performing regional governments (those that spent the highest portion of revenue on 'IERG, t'). In 2005 and 2006, this percentage varied from 10% to 15% (Table A1 .1). The proposed value for use in Equation is 12% in the 'base case majority' scenario. Alternative scenarios. At the request of DJPK, the Consultant performed the same analysis for two additional scenarios:
The 'small majority scenario', which considers the 65% best performing regional governments.
The 'large majority scenario', which considers the 85% best performing regional governments.
As shown in Table A1.2 and Table A1 .3 overleaf, both sets of regional governments spend -on average -about 93% of revenue on operational and investment expenditure (78%+15% and 83%+10%, respectively). However, the 'small majority' group, which consists of better-performing local governments than the 
Potential Impact of Permanent Intercept
Measuring the potential impact of the permanent intercept. The potential impact of the permanent intercept on basic needs was measured by estimating the portion of intercept space that would be used by full recovery of loan arrears within one year. This portion is hereinafter also referred to as the intercept space utilization ratio (ISUR). The impact of the permanent intercept is deemed acceptable if the ISUR does not exceed 100%. In such case, the intercept space (for one year) would exceed arrears. In formula: . ISURs were estimated for seven of these 10 provinces and for 54 of 96 districts. For none of these provincial governments in the sample would a permanent intercept of all arrears account for more than 20% of intercept space. In the 'base case majority' scenario, the same observation applies to most district governments (Table A1 .4). Only in the case of one district (Kota Manado) would the permanent intercept account for more than 100% of the estimated intercept space under the 'optimistic' basic needs scenario. Under a 'pessimistic' or 'moderate' basic needs scenario, the Government would have been able recover arrears on all regional government loans in 2007 through the use of the permanent intercept without affecting the ability of the affected regional governments to provide basic needs. Results of the impact analysis for alternative scenarios. As expected, the results of the analysis are are less favorable for the 'large majority scenario' than for the base case or 'small majority' scenarios. This is not surprisingly because the former scenario includes by definition a larger number of poor-performing regional governments. Even under the 'large majority scenario', however, only under extreme circumstances would a permanent intercept account for more than 100% of the estimated intercept space of 2 out of 61 regional governments (Table A1 .6). As shown in Table A1.2 and Table A1 .3 overleaf, both sets of regional governments spend -on average -about 93% of revenue on operational and investment expenditure (78%+15% and 83%+10%, respectively). However, the 'small 
